organizational change. Relying on the modular theory of the firm, they argue that the positive effects of outsourcing on productivity growth materialize only after managers have identified the organizational architectures that most efficiently combine the externalities from value-adding activities such as research and development (R&D), design, production and marketing. So, the effect of outsourcing on productivity growth passes through organizational innovations that take the form of new modules in which the positive externalities from closely related activities are maximized.
In this paper, we propose a different but complementary, argument. Since outsourcing may lead to a re-organization of production-and a new internal division of labor caused by wage, functional and/or numerical flexibility (Benson and Ieronimo 1996; Murphy 2002 )its short-run effect on productivity will depend on workers' capabilities to learn, absorb and effectively implement the organizational change. One of the main channels through which learning occurs within the firm is training. The idea behind this paper is that outsourcing generates positive productivity effects only if it is part of a broader knowledge management strategy involving skills training. This notion complements Windrum et al. ' s argument about the role of managers in the search for new and efficient organizational structures, by suggesting that training represents one way that outsourcing-induced organizational change translates into real productivity gains. 1 This idea is partly aligned to Bengtsson and Dabhilkar's (2009) thesis that firm performance depends on other manufacturing strategies that firms apply when outsourcing. However, we would suggest the crucial aspect is the organizational change induced by outsourcing and the capability of this a new organizational setting to stimulate skills upgrades through training.
The theoretical link between outsourcing, training and productivity may be sensitive to the type of activity being outsourced. Firms may decide to outsource production or service activities. The former choice may be related to cost-saving reasons or to the lack of internal skills, as typical of small firms. The latter, instead, may be more linked to the need of the firm to focus on its core competences, so to release ancillary or low value-added stages while keeping highly strategic activities like design or R&D. In principle, for a manufacturing firm we would expect production outsourcing to imply a stronger re-organization of the value chain (for example, because of a redefinition of the production modules), and so to a higher training intensity, while service outsourcing should imply small changes of the production process and so a lower need for adaptation and training.
The link between outsourcing and training emerges in several empirical studies. While most research focuses on understanding how the introduction of new organizational practices increases the absolute and relative demand for skilled labor (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Caroli 2001; Caroli, Greenan, and Guellec 2001; Caroli and Van Reenen 2001; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002; Piva, Santarelli, and Vivarelli 2005) , the link between organizational change and other forms of human capital, such as training, has 1 In alternative, learning can also occur through the hiring of new skilled personnel. However, data from the Continuing vocational Training survey (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/continuing-vocational-training-survey) show that, regardless of size, European firms are much more inclined to provide training to update the skills of the existing workforce, rather than providing new skills to newly acquired personnel. In addition, data show that medium and large firms consider training as a structural activity. This picture is also confirmed for Italy by Unioncamere-Ministero del Lavoro, sistema Formativo Excelsior (2014). been less thoroughly investigated. In a study of Italian manufacturing, Antonelli, Antonietti, and Guidetti (2010) find that outsourcing positively affects both the likelihood that firms will provide in-house training and the number of employees under training. Guidetti and Mazzanti (2007) and Antonioli, Manzalini, and Pini (2011) focus on manufacturing firms in the Modena and Reggio Emilia local production systems in the Emilia Romagna region of Italy and provide additional evidence of a positive link between organizational innovation, human resource practices and firm-provided training. These results hold also in the case of Swiss firms: Hollenstein and Stucki (2012) document that while the propensity to work in teams positively affects the likelihood of training, its intensity is increased by changes to the hierarchical structure of the firm.
The positive productivity effects of training are acknowledged in many empirical studies. For example, Groot (1999) finds that trained workers show an average increase of 8 per cent in productivity with respect to non-trained colleagues, while Barrett and O'Connell (2001) in a study of Irish establishments in the 1990s find a positive and statistically significant productivity effect only for general or combined general-specific training but no relevant effect for specific training. For British establishments in the period 1988 , Schonewille (2001 finds a positive productivity effect for training, significant at 10 per cent. For Italy, Conti (2005) provides panel evidence of a positive effect of training on labor productivity in the period -1999 , while Colombo and Stanca (2014 find that such a positive effect is higher when training is targeted on blue-collars rather than on clerks and executives. Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen (2006) using data for a panel of British firms in 1983-1996, estimate that a 1 per cent increase in training provision generates a 0.6 per cent increase in average labor productivity. Finally, Almeida and Carneiro (2009) study a panel of large firms in Portugal, and taking account of training costs, find an estimated +8.6 per cent return on productivity for firms that provide training.
This paper is an attempt to link these two streams of the literature, both from a conceptual and from an empirical point of view. To test the outsourcing-training-productivity relationship, we use an original data-set of Italian manufacturing firms which links information on outsourcing with data on training. Since firms may self-select into outsourcing, and the training-productivity relationship might be affected by simultaneity bias, we estimate a system of three simultaneous equations, where it is possible to identify a truly recursive set of linkages. Specifically, we estimate an outsourcing equation where the decision to outsource is explained by a set of firm-and industry-specific characteristics, together with a training equation, where the predicted value of outsourcing enters as a regressor among the others, and a productivity equation where training, induced by outsourcing, is included.
The estimation results confirm the hypothesis proposed in this paper: outsourcing has a significant indirect relation with productivity, which is mediated by induced training. We find also that this indirect relationship holds only in the case of production outsourcing and in the case of training provided off the job to top and middle managers. This is evidence that production outsourcing generates positive outcomes only as part of a broader firm re-organization strategy that stimulates learning and competence accumulation in the knowledge-intensive share of the workforce.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides some descriptive statistics; Section 3 presents the empirical model and the econometric strategy; Section 4 discusses the estimation results and some robustness checks; and Section 5 concludes. The 9th survey on manufacturing firms gathered information on a representative sample of 4,289 manufacturing firms across the 2001-2003 period. While firms with more than 500 employees are fully represented, those with more than 10 and fewer than 500 employees are selected based on their geographical location, size and Pavitt (1984) industry. The survey includes rich information on firm characteristics and activities. For the present study, we exploit information on firm size, industry, area of firm localization, labor force composition, innovation and export activities (Capitalia 2005) .
Excelsior data are compiled by the Italian Chambers of Commerce in collaboration with the Italian Ministry of Labor and the European Social Fund. They provide information on predicted demand for labor as well as actual employment, for a representative sample of some 100,000 private companies with more than 1 employee, distributed across Italy (Centro Studi Unioncamere 2007). The data are organized according into four categories: (i) annual predicted employment inflows and outflows by the type of occupational profile (i.e. managers, clerks and plant operators), (ii) characteristics and qualifications of new job applicants, such as age, experience, education, gender, immigration status, type of labor contract, further training after recruitment, foreign language ability and informatics skills, (iii) use of a-typical employment contracts (like part-time contracts, vocational training contracts, contracts of insertion, apprenticeship, fixed-term contracts, agency contracts, project-based contracts and cooperation contracts) and (iv) training activities provided by firms to their actual workforce. In this work, we use the information on training in the year 2003.
Merging the two data-sets results in a sample of 1,545 observations. Those with missing values for employment and balance sheet variables or negative value added were dropped. The final sample is composed of 1,410 firms, whose distribution is shown in Table 1 .
While the industry and geographic distribution of firms is in line with census data, the size distribution is biased against small firms. This should be taken into account when discussing the estimation results, which apply more the cases of medium-sized and large firms. This represents a limitation of this paper; however, medium and large firms account for almost 50 per cent of national employment in Italy, and are the types of firms that are the most innovative and internationalized. 3 Table 2 presents some summary statistics for the sample of outsourcing firms. The percentages in columns show that outsourcing (both production and service) firms are predominantly medium-sized, are located in the north of Italy, and belong to traditional supplier-dominated and specialized supplier industries. For a detailed discussion of sample construction and external validity, see Antonelli, Antonietti, and Guidetti (2010) .
In general, 21.42 per cent of firms outsource at least one activity: among these, 38.74 per cent outsource only production activities and 42.05 per cent outsource only service activities. Among the service activities outsourced, almost 70 per cent are knowledge-intensive (i.e. computing-related, R&D and engineering, testing and technical analysis, advertising) and the remaining 30 per cent are traditional (administration, bookkeeping, call-center, janitorial services, storage). Table 3 , instead, shows the distribution of firms by the type of training provided. We observe that, similarly to outsourcing, firms providing training are of medium and large size, concentrated in the north of Italy and belong to traditional and specialized suppliers sectors. 4 Figure 1 depicts the structure of the model. We assume a non-direct relationship between outsourcing on productivity (lines in bold): since outsourcing (in particular of production phases) generates a change in the organization of production, it requires firms to adapt by investing in training activities. Potential increases in (labor) productivity pass through the indirect effect of outsourcing on training.
The empirical model
To test for this hypothesis, we adopt the following empirical strategy. As a preliminary step, we estimate a standard production function, augmented with the outsourcing and training variables (and their interaction), like the following: 4 Interestingly, when we look at the frequency of outsourcing within each size category, we observe that small, medium and large firms tend to outsource more or less with the same frequency, but small firms outsource production activities relatively more intensively than medium and large firms, whereas the opposite holds for service outsourcing. Outsourcing is also more intense in the north of Italy and in science-based industries. Training, instead, is more frequently provided by large firms, by firms located in the north of Italy and by firms in specialized suppliers and science-based industries. where i is the firm, Y/L is the labor productivity, i.e. value added per employee in 2003, K/L is the capital-labor ratio in 2001; L H /L and L U /L are, respectively, the share of skilled (i.e. white collar workers-managers, executives and clerks) and unskilled (i.e. plant operators) workers in 2001. OUT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i outsources an activity previously developed in-house (j = production, service) and 0 otherwise, and refers to the period 2001-2003. TRAIN is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i provided training for its workforce in year 2003; OUT*TRAIN is the interaction term between OUT j and TRAIN; and X is a vector of controls for the macro-area of localization (northwest, northeast, center and south), industry (at two digit level) and size (small, medium and large).
If the estimated coefficients of OUT j , TRAIN and OUT j *TRAIN turn out to be not statistically significant, we can exclude a direct correlation between outsourcing and productivity. In this case, the next step is the estimation of a production function where outsourcing enters only as a determinant of training.
One issue is that the presence of unobserved factors affecting both outsourcing and productivity may affect the estimates of the outsourcing-training-productivity relationship. Second, the sample may include occasional outsources, which are not driven by the expected motivations in externalizing their activities, or it can be that the most productive firms self-select into outsourcing. Moreover, the training-productivity relation could be affected by simultaneity bias. For these reasons, in line with the idea that "outsourcing motives and effects should not be analyzed in isolation" (Bengtsson and Dabhilkar 2009, p. 254) , we estimate a recursive system of three (seemingly unrelated) equations. The first is an outsourcing equation in which the probability to subcontract production or service activities is related to a specific set of determinants. Then, (predicted) outsourcing enters as an explanatory variable in the training equation and allows the construction of a recursive set of relations: the outsourcing decision, induced by a series of variables, affects the training decision, which, in turn, affects (labor) productivity. The three equations are the following:
Equation 2 models the outsourcing decision of firm i. According to Abraham and Taylor (1996) , three elements can affect the probability of outsourcing. One of the strongest
motivations for externalizing activities is labor cost savings. Therefore, we would expect high-wage firms to have a higher propensity to outsource their activities. However, if outsourcing occurs between similar firms, or follows a networking strategy rather than a search purely for lower wages, the effect of these costs can be insignificant for firms' outsourcing behavior (Taymaz and Kiliçaslan, 2005) . The second variable is related to the need to deal with market uncertainty, and to smooth the workload of the regular workforce. Relying on the assumption that organizations prefer a steady flow of work, we would expect that firms facing higher uncertainty in output demand will be more likely to outsource their production or service activities than firms operating in more stable environments. Conversely, it might be that higher market uncertainty leads firms to integrate activities in order to minimize the risks and costs associated with re-contracting.
The third determinant is local availability of specialized suppliers. If there is a shortage of internal skills, and/or if scale economies can be achieved from external provision of specialized services, firms may find it more profitable to externalize their activities. Abraham and Taylor (1996) capture this effect using two variables: firm size-based on the idea that small firms are more likely to subcontract than larger ones, and firm location in a dense urban area because availability of suppliers will be higher and the cost of outsourcing lower (Ono 2007) .
We include a fourth determinant of outsourcing, i.e. technology. According to recent studies, rapid technological change and innovation make outsourcing beneficial for firms because of the reduced time to amortize the sunk costs associated with purchase of new technology (Bartel, Lach, and Sicherman 2014) , or because it allows the firm to focus on innovative activities and exploit its core competencies (Antonietti and Cainelli 2008; Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini 2009). 5 To measure UNCERTAINTY, I use the index proposed by Fan (2000) , which computes the standard deviation of residuals from the following de-trending equation:
where IPI is the Industrial Production Index for sector s in year t, and ς is the error component. In line with Abraham and Taylor (1996) , and in the absence of quarterly data on sales or employment, we use yearly information on industrial production at the level of the 13 two-digit manufacturing sectors to which the firm belonged over the period 1991-2000.
ULC is the (log) labor cost per employee 6 in 2001. TECHNOLOGY is a vector of two innovation input variables, namely (log) of total R&D expenditure per employee (R&D) and (log) investments in new machinery and equipment per employee (M&E), both measured in year 2001 to avoid simultaneity with the dependent variable.
Firm size (SIZE) is represented by a vector of three dummy variables-for small firms (11-50 employees), for medium-sized firms (51-250 employees) and for large firms (more than 250 employees), used as the reference category. I also control for two characteristics 5 Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini (2009) provide a comprehensive survey on the drivers of outsourcing decisions. Here, we focus only on those variables that can be utilized in the estimates because of limitations on data availability.
(5) IPI S,t = 0 + 1 t + S,t 6 According to Abraham and Taylor (1996) , an average measure of unit wages (or labor cost) can be a misleading indicator of the firm's position in the wage hierarchy, because it can reflect either differences in wage rates for similar works, or differences in the skill level of the work performed. Unfortunately, the data-set provides information on yearly labor cost, without distinguishing among types of occupation. of the area (AREA) in which the firm is located. The first is a set of four dummy variables capturing the macro-area in which the firm is located, i.e. NUTS-1 regions northwest, northeast, centre and south of Italy, with south of Italy used as the reference category. Since we do not have information at a finer geographical scale, we compute an index for degree of "districtization" of the NUTS-2 region. This index (DISTRICT REGION) is given by the ratio between manufacturing employment in the local labor systems classified as industrial districts in region R (in 1991), and total manufacturing employment in region R (as computed in De Arcangelis and Ferri 2005). The higher this index, the higher the presence and weight of industrial districts in the region, which should facilitate outsourcing due to the higher local availability of specialized suppliers typical of the industrial district model based on flexible specialization (Brusco 1982) .
Equation 3 depicts firm's training behavior. Following the literature on the determinants of training (Bassanini et al. 2005; Antonelli, Antonietti, and Guidetti 2010; Hollenstein and Stucki 2012) , and to consistently estimate the parameters of the model, among the regressors we include the capital-labor ratio K/L, the share of skilled L H /L and unskilled labor L U /L, the outsourcing dummies and the vector of additional controls X which now includes also a dummy for firm export status (EXPORT) and R&D intensity (R&D).
Equation 4 is the labor productivity equation, where, as in Equation 1, the dependent variable is the log value added per employee in 2003, and the regressors include the (predicted) TRAIN variable, the log share of skilled L H /L and unskilled labor L U /L, the log of the capital-labor ratio K/L, and the augmented vector of controls X as in Equation 3. The terms ξ, u and η are the error components, which are modeled as jointly normally distributed. 7 We also provide three robustness checks. First, we re-estimate Equation 2 using the dummies for production outsourcing (OUT_PROD) and service outsourcing (OUT_SERV) as dependent variables. In so doing, we control whether the indirect link between outsourcing and productivity depends on the type of activities being outsourced by the firm. In this case, we estimate a system of four equations, two for outsourcing, one for training and one for productivity.
Second, outsourcing may either alter the input mix, inducing firms to substitute for labor, or affect the efficiency, rather than the scale, of the firm. For these reasons, Y/L may represent a misleading output measure. So, we re-estimate Equations 1 and 4 using the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as a dependent variable. However, because we do not have information on variables that can be used as instruments for labor and capital, we computed the TFP as the residual of a standard Cobb-Douglas production function with capital, skilled and unskilled labor as inputs, to which we add the constant term.
Third, it could be that the indirect impact of outsourcing on productivity depends on the specific type of training provided (Colombo and Stanca 2014) . Since the data-set gathers information on the type of occupational profile to which training is targeted, we consider three dummies that represent the following types of training: training for managers 7 Equations 2-4 are estimated simultaneously using the stata routine cmp, developed by Roodman (2011) . From the computational point of view, cmp is fundamentally a seemingly unrelated regressions (sUR) estimator, which treats each equation independently, except from modeling their error terms as jointly normally distributed. However, maximum likelihood sUR models can consistently estimate parameters in a subclass of simultaneous systems, namely those with clearly defined stages and where all the endogenous (continuous or binary) variables are observed and appear on the right-hand side of the equations, and so where instruments allow the construction of a recursive set of equations. since only the final stages are structural, the estimation is limited-information maximum likelihood.
(TRAIN_MAN), training for executives and middle managers (TRAIN_EXE) and training for plant operators (TRAIN_PO). The data-set also provides information on place of training, i.e. internal (TRAIN_INT) and external (TRAIN_EXT) to the firm. Therefore, we re-estimated the entire model using these dummies as dependent variables in the training equation. 8
Results
Tables 4-8 present the estimation results. Table 4 refers to the preliminary estimates of the production function, augmented with the training and outsourcing dummies (Equation 1). In Columns 1-3 the dependent variable is labor productivity, while in Columns 4-6 the dependent variable is the TFP. The OLS estimates show that outsourcing is never statistically significant, even when we distinguish between production and service outsourcing. Moreover, even the interaction terms OUT j *TRAIN are never statistically significant across specifications. The estimated coefficient of training, instead, is always highly significant, with an average value ranging between 0.06 and 0.07 for labor productivity and 0.09-0.10 for TFP. Therefore, results from Table 4 confirm that outsourcing does not have a direct relation with productivity.
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For computational reasons, it was not possible to estimate all these training equations simultaneously. Therefore, we estimated five different recursive systems of three equations, as shown in Table 8 . Table 5 shows the results of the recursive model estimates. Column 1 shows that the (general) propensity to outsource increases with uncertainty, location in the northern and central regions (taken here as a sign of availability of local skills) and technology, both in terms of R&D intensity and in terms of investments in new machinery and equipment. Since size and the unit labor cost are never statistically significant, we might argue that traditional motives related to cost saving are not relevant here. What matters more are the technology-related variables, firm localization and market uncertainty.
Column 2 provides the results of the training equation. Estimates show that small and medium firms are less inclined to provide training, whereas firms endowed with a higher share of skilled personnel are more likely to train. In line with our assumption, the estimated coefficient of (predicted) outsourcing is positive and highly statistically significant: once Table 5 . Outsourcing, training and productivity: recursive system estimates. notes: A constant term is also included in all the estimates. * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.
(1) (2) (3) −0.720 *** ρ 13 (OUT-Y/L) −0.119 *** ρ 23 (TRAIN-Y/L) −0.125 *** accounted for its determinants, a higher recourse to outsourcing makes training provision more likely. Column 3 reports the results of the labor productivity equation, once augmented with the (predicted) training variable. As expected, small firms and firms located in the South of Italy are less productive than large firms and firms located in the north and center. In addition, a higher labor productivity relates to a higher capital-labor ratio, a higher share of skilled workers and a lower share of unskilled workers. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of Table 6 . Robustness check: production outsourcing, service outsourcing, training and labor productivity. notes: A constant term is also included in all the estimates. * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.
( (predicted) TRAIN is positive and statistically significant at 5 per cent level: a higher propensity to train, driven by a higher propensity to outsource, corresponds, on average, to a higher level of labor productivity. From Tables 4 and 5, it emerges that our main research hypothesis is confirmed: outsourcing is related to higher productivity only if firms provide training for their workforce. 9 Tables 6-8 show the results emerging from the robustness analyses. In Table 6 , we estimate Equation 2 distinguishing between production and services outsourcing as dependent variables. The estimates in Column 1 show that production outsourcing is related more to geographical location, employment size, uncertainty and investments in new equipment. This evidence is in line with previous studies showing that outsourcing occurs more frequently, and more intensively, when firms are located in more dense market areas (Ono 2007; Antonietti and Cainelli 2008; Holl 2008; Antonietti, Ferrante, and Leoncini 2014; Cainelli and Iacobucci 2012) .
Estimates in Column 2 show that service outsourcing is mainly related to innovation drivers such as R&D and capital-embodied technology. So, while firms outsource production activities for motivations related to internal skills shortages, external skills availability, market uncertainty and fixed investments, the outsourcing of service activities is driven by the need to focus on core technology and competencies, thus externalizing the ancillary stages of the value chain. As predicted, Column 3 shows that only (predicted) production outsourcing corresponds to a statistically significant increase in the probability of training, while the estimated coefficient of (predicted) service outsourcing is positive but not statistically different from zero. Results in Column 4 confirm that training, induced by a higher recourse to production outsourcing, positively relates to labor productivity. This first refinement shows that our hypothesis holds only in the case of production outsourcing, because it stimulates a deeper organizational change than service outsourcing that requires learning and adaptation.
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The fact that the ρ coefficients are statistically significant means that the error terms of Equations 2-4 are correlated and so that the use of a recursive system of three equations is appropriate. notes: A constant term is also included in all the estimates. * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.
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Ref. Equation 3 ). Results in both Columns confirm our hypothesis: (production) outsourcing corresponds to a higher TFP only when firms are induced to provide training to their workforce. Therefore, a higher training frequency, induced by outsourcing, is also positively associated with a higher level of efficiency of the firm.
R&D
Finally, Table 8 provides robustness results for training targets. 10 Looking at Columns 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, it is clear that (predicted) outsourcing positively relates to all the types of training. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10, instead, show that the type of training matters for explaining the heterogeneous productivity impact of outsourcing. In particular, we find that outsourcing has an impact on productivity via training of top and middle managers and executives, and via off-the-job training.
Firms outsourcing production phases-motivated by internal skills shortages, external skills availability, market uncertainty and capital-embodied technology-are likely to induce a kind of organizational change which re-defines existing production-related tasks (e.g. through modularization) because of the reduction in the firm's productive base. The training needed in order to benefit from the new organizational structure is primarily targeted at top and middle management and is provided outside the firm, probably because of the need to acquire new competencies that are not available in-house.
In our view, this explanation complements the results provided in Windrum, Reinstaller, and Bull (2009) : once firms outsource, they become more productive if managers can identify and select an organizational structure that more efficiently coordinates high value-added modules and also after workers have been trained so as to maximize the benefits deriving from the new organizational setting, the new internal division of labor, and the exploitation of existing core competencies. This supports a complementary role of external relations (i.e. through outsourcing) and knowledge management practices (i.e. through training) for fostering productivity (Murphy 2002) .
Conclusions
This paper explored the short-run relationship between outsourcing and productivity. It posits that outsourcing generates positive returns only if it is part of a broader organizational strategy that involves worker training. Using an original data-set of Italian manufacturing firms, a recursive system of three equations was estimated, accounting for self-selection into outsourcing and simultaneity in the training-productivity relationship. Evidence is found that, in the short run, outsourcing may be associated with higher levels of productivity. This positive link is indirect and mediated by a higher induced propensity to train. Such a 10 All the models in Table 8 have been initially estimated using labor productivity as dependent variable. However, the log likelihood function always failed to become concave and reach a maximum. so, we decided to use the TFP as the dependent variable. As for Table 7 , to save on space, we do not report the estimation results for the outsourcing equation.
relationship holds only when the firm outsources production activities and when training is provided off the job and targeted to top and middle managers.
These results provide firm-level evidence of an interplay between production organization practices and knowledge management practices for fostering firm productivity. In this respect, outsourcing can be seen as a form of strategic flexibility where firms adopt a different form of workplace organization in order to improve their performance.
From a policy perspective, the paper argues that, if outsourcing is not oriented to increasing the firm's functional flexibility, its productivity returns are uncertain. On the other hand, if outsourcing is part of a broader organizational strategy aimed at improving internal efficiency through learning and skills upgrading, it can generate positive returns to productivity. Therefore, outsourcing should not be treated as a way just for firms to cut labor costs; it should be seen also as a tool for exploiting core competencies and fostering organizational change. In the latter case, policies should be oriented to helping firms adopt the complementary organizational practices that make outsourcing more profitable, with a particular focus on training.
We should refer to the scope of the analysis in this paper. The cross-sectional nature of the data-set and the high incidence of medium-and large-sized firms means that the results are not fully generalizable or robust to endogeneity, so they should be considered robust correlations rather than causal relationships. However, the paper provides a new interpretative framework for explaining the outsourcing-productivity paradox, which could be applied to longitudinal as well as larger and more representative contexts.
